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DON’T DIE! HOW BIOSIMILAR DISPARAGEMENT 
VIOLATES ANTITRUST LAW 
Michael A. Carrier 
ABSTRACT—Competition is the key to low prices in the pharmaceutical 
industry. For decades, Americans have benefitted from affordable generic 
versions of brand-name drugs. But now, we stand poised on the wave of a 
revolution. Biologics, which include lifesaving, cancer-treating drugs, can 
cost hundreds of thousands of dollars per year and are forecast to be the 
“fastest growing segment of drug spending” in coming years. 
The hope, then, is that just like generic drugs, competition from follow-
on products known as biosimilars will lower prices. But the fear is that they 
will not. Why? One main reason is disparagement. 
Biosimilars are nearly the same as biologics. In fact, they are required 
to be “highly similar” to, and have “no clinically meaningful differences” 
from, biologics. Despite this, biologic manufacturers have raised ominous 
warnings that biosimilars are not the same as biologics but have differences 
that pose grave safety consequences. Doctors are getting the message loud 
and clear and are refusing to prescribe appropriate—and more affordable—
biosimilars. It thus comes as no surprise that government agencies have 
serious concerns about the behavior of biologic companies. 
This Essay addresses biologic manufacturers’ disparagement of 
biosimilars. It sketches the background of the industry and introduces the 
unique regulatory setting. It then sets forth the caselaw and explains how 
disparagement can violate antitrust law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Competition is the key to low prices in the pharmaceutical industry. For 
decades, Americans have benefitted from affordable generic versions of 
brand-name drugs. But now, as biologics enter the market, we stand on the 
precipice of a revolution. In fact, biologics, which can cost patients hundreds 
of thousands of dollars per year, are predicted to be the “fastest growing 
segment of drug spending in the coming years.”1 
The hope, then, is that competition from follow-on products, known as 
biosimilars, will lower prices for patients. But pharmaceutical companies’ 
campaign of biosimilar disparagement threatens to block this goal. 
 
 1 Brian K. Chen, Y. Tony Yang & Charles L. Bennett, Why Biologics and Biosimilars Remain So 
Expensive: Despite Two Wins for Biosimilars, the Supreme Court’s Recent Rulings Do Not Solve 
Fundamental Barriers to Competition, DRUGS (Nov. 16, 2018), 1777, 1777 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/30446980 [https://perma.cc/U2BW-48GU]; Press Release, Scott 
Gotlieb, Remarks from FDA Commissioner Scott Gottlieb, M.D., as Prepared for Delivery at the 
Brookings Institution on the Release of the FDA’s Biosimilars Action Plan (July 18, 2018), 
https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/remarks-fda-commissioner-scott-gottlieb-md-
prepared-delivery-brookings-institution-release-fdas [https://perma.cc/4BWT-TJFD] [hereinafter 
Remarks from FDA Commissioner]. 
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Biologics are large, complex molecules derived from living organisms, 
most commonly proteins.2 According to the FDA, biologics “often represent 
the cutting-edge of biomedical research and, in time, may offer the most 
effective means to treat a variety of medical illnesses and conditions” that 
have “no other treatments available.”3 Monoclonal antibodies, the most 
frequently developed type of biologic,4 include blockbuster products such as 
infection-reducing Neulasta,5 as well as Humira6 and Remicade,7 both of 
which treat arthritis, colitis, and Crohn’s disease. In targeting unhealthy cells 
without harming healthy cells,8 monoclonal antibodies have dramatically 
increased survival rates.9 Other types of biologics include vaccines, blood 
products, and gene therapies.10 
Biosimilars are legally required to be “highly similar” to, and have “no 
clinically meaningful differences” from, biologics.11 Despite this 
requirement, biologic manufacturers have warned physicians and patients 
that the products are not the same, intimating that the differences pose grave 
safety concerns. And physicians are listening, refusing to prescribe 
appropriate and affordable biosimilars.12 It thus comes as no surprise that 
government agencies, like the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC), have raised “serious concerns about false 
 
 2  Michael A. Carrier & Carl J. Minniti III, Biologics: The New Antitrust Frontier, 2018 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 1, 5 (2018); What Are “Biologics” Questions and Answers, FDA, https://www.fda.gov/about-
fda/center-biologics-evaluation-and-research-cber/what-are-biologics-questions-and-answers 
[https://perma.cc/2TGQ-Q3CQ]. 
 3  What Are “Biologics” Questions and Answers, supra note 2.  
 4 One report concluded that 338 of the 907 biologics in development were monoclonal antibodies. 
PHRMA, MEDICINES IN DEVELOPMENT: BIOLOGICS 4 (2013), http://phrma-
docs.phrma.org/sites/default/files/pdf/biologicsoverview2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/WA4A-74F5]. 
 5 NEULASTA, https://www.neulasta.com/ [https://perma.cc/EL8D-F9UK]. 
 6 HUMIRA, https://www.humira.com/?cid=ppc_ppd_msft_franchise_brand_2015_humira_Exact_64
X1790908 [https://perma.cc/SQ52-8VY2]. 
 7 REMICADE, https://www.remicade.com/?utm_source=bing&utm_medium=cpc&utm_campaign
=Branded&utm_content=RAIS%20-%20General&utm_term=remicade&gclid=CJnFzq2_hNICFSi2gQ
od1FgEaQ&gclsrc=ds [https://perma.cc/J3X6-JYSS]. 
 8 How Targeted Therapies Are Used to Treat Cancer, AM. CANCER SOC’Y, 
https://www.cancer.org/treatment/treatments-and-side-effects/treatment-types/targeted-therapy/what-
is.html [https://perma.cc/334L-KHUA]. 
 9 For example, the development of Rituxan in the 1990s substantially improved the treatment of non-
Hodgkin’s lymphoma, the most common form of blood cancer in adults. Efrat Dotan, Charu Aggarwal & 
Mitchell R. Smith, Impact of Rituximab (Rituxan) on the Treatment of B-Cell Non-Hodgkin’s Lymphoma, 
35 PHARM. & THERAPY 148, 148 (2010), 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2844047/#!po=23.6842 [https://perma.cc/S6SE-26BK] 
(supplementing chemotherapy regimens with Rituxan improved patients’ survival rate from 57% to 70% 
in one study). 
 10 What Are “Biologics” Questions and Answers, supra note 2. 
 11 42 U.S.C. § 262(i)(2) (2012). 
 12 See infra notes 165–172 and accompanying text. 
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or misleading statements and their negative impacts on public health and 
competition.”13 
This Essay addresses biologic companies’ disparagement of 
biosimilars. Part I sketches the background of the industry, and Part II 
discusses its unique regulatory setting. Part III then sets forth the caselaw, 
while Part IV explains how, under two separate approaches, disparagement 
can violate antitrust law. 
I. BIOLOGICS 
The relationship between biologics and biosimilars differs from that 
between brand-name drugs and their generic counterparts. This Part sketches 
these differences and discusses the relevant statute for biologics and 
biosimilars, as well as biologic companies’ disparagement of biosimilars. 
A. Scientific Differences 
The science underlying biologics and small-molecule (brand) drugs is 
different. Small molecules are created through a series of chemical reactions 
known as chemical synthesis.14 The process is predictable, which allows 
generics to cheaply imitate brand drugs.15 Put another way, brands and 
generics can put the same pieces of a puzzle together in the same way to 
create the same image. Biologics, in contrast, emphasize not the individual 
pieces of the puzzle but the way the puzzle is constructed. Because “the 
product is the process,” and the use of living cells to create biologics is 
inherently sensitive, there is higher variability in the product’s final form.16 
This variability presents challenges to biosimilar manufacturers. Even 
if these entities can rely on patent disclosures and other materials in the 
public domain, they will lack access to critical information that is protected 
as a trade secret.17 Because biologics are “so closely defined by their 
manufacturing process,” this secrecy blocks competition.18 All of these 
 
 13 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. & FED. TRADE COMM’N, JOINT STATEMENT OF THE FOOD & DRUG 
ADMINISTRATION AND THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION REGARDING A COLLABORATION TO ADVANCE 
COMPETITION IN THE BIOLOGIC MARKETPLACE 3 (Feb. 3, 2020), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1565273/v190003fdaftcbiologicsstatem
ent.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y4YS-HMKQ] [hereinafter JOINT STATEMENT]. 
 14 See LAURENCE A. BORDEN, PHARMACEUTICAL AND BIOTECH PATENT LAW §§ C:5.1, C:5.2 
(2020).  
 15 See infra note 85 and accompanying text. 
 16 JAMES T. O’REILLY & KATHARINE A. VAN TASSEL, FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION § 13:135 
(4th ed. 2020). For a discussion of changes during the product’s maturation and uncertainties in the 
structure of a protein (a typical biologic), see Michael A. Carrier & Carl J. Minniti III, Biologics: The 
New Antitrust Frontier, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 7–8 (2018). 
 17 W. Nicholson Price II, Regulating Secrecy, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1769, 1793–94 (2016). 
 18 Id. at 1794. 
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development difficulties minimize the price reductions that biosimilars can 
unleash in comparison to generics. 
B. Statutory Framework 
The framework statute for biologics, the Biologics Price Competition 
and Innovation Act (BPCIA),19 was designed to encourage innovation and 
competition. To foster innovation, it provides biologic drugs with two 
exclusivity periods.20 The first period begins when the biologic (known as 
the reference product) is approved and lasts for four years.21 During this 
period, the FDA will not accept an application from a biosimilar 
manufacturer.22 In the second period, even after the FDA can accept a 
biosimilar application, it cannot grant approval until twelve years after the 
date the biologic was first licensed.23 This 12-year exclusivity period gives 
biologic products strong protection in the marketplace. 
The BPCIA fosters follow-on competition through an abbreviated 
approval pathway for biosimilars.24 To gain approval as a biosimilar under 
the BPCIA, an applicant must show that 
the biological product is highly similar to the reference product notwithstanding 
minor differences in clinically inactive components; and [] there are no 
clinically meaningful differences between the biological product and the 
reference product in terms of the safety, purity, and potency of the product.25 
A biosimilar manufacturer can show that its product is highly similar to 
the reference product by “extensively analyzing . . . the structure and 
function” of both products.26 The FDA has made it clear that “[m]inor 
differences . . . in clinically inactive components are acceptable,” with the 
agency “carefully evaluat[ing]” such disparities to ensure that the biosimilar 
“meets FDA’s high approval standards.”27 In fact, “slight differences” are 
expected during the manufacturing process, not only for biosimilars but also 
 
 19  Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111–148, 124 Stat. 804 
(2010). 
 20 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7) (2012). 
 21 Id. § 262(k)(7)(B). 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. § 262(k)(7)(A). 
 24 Id. § 262(k). 
 25 Id. § 262(i)(2) (emphasis added). 
 26 Biosimilar and Interchangeable Products, FDA, 
https://www.fda.gov/drugs/biosimilars/biosimilar-and-interchangeable-products [https://perma.cc/BHW
4-YU4W]. 
 27 Id. 
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for biologics. As one company has explained, “most biologics vary and . . . 
in fact are not identical batch-to-batch. . . .”28 
A biosimilar manufacturer’s ability to make these showings assuages 
fears that its product is not as safe as the biologic. A coalition of nearly thirty 
pharmaceutical regulators from around the world has explained that 
biosimilars demonstrate similarity through “extensive laboratory 
comparability studies.”29 These studies use “highly sensitive state-of-the-art 
analytical technology that allows robust and extensive examination and 
comparison of the biosimilar and originator molecules.”30 
The benefits of obtaining follow-on approval under the BPCIA differ 
from those under the Hatch-Waxman Act, Congress’s framework statute for 
competition and innovation in the small-molecule, or brand-drug, setting.31 
Unlike the Hatch-Waxman regime, in which the first generic manufacturer 
to file what is known as a “Paragraph IV” certification (claiming that the 
brand’s patent is invalid or not infringed32) is eligible for a 180-day period of 
exclusivity, the first to file a biosimilar does not benefit from such 
protection.33 Rather, exclusivity is granted only to the first biosimilar that 
clears the higher threshold of interchangeability.34 
To attain interchangeability status, the applicant must show that the 
follow-on version (1) “is biosimilar to the reference product” and (2) “can 
be expected to produce the same clinical result as the reference product in 
any given patient.”35 For products administered more than once to an 
individual, the follow-on maker must show that the risk of switching between 
products is not greater than the risk of not switching.36 If the applicant 
seeking interchangeability can meet this standard, it will receive exclusivity, 
which expires (if certain other litigation or approval thresholds are not 
 
 28 Boehringer Ingelheim, Comment Letter on Pfizer’s Citizen Petition to FDA, Docket # FDA-2018-
P-3281, at 3 (Jan. 25, 2019) [hereinafter Boehringer Letter] (on file with author). 
 29 ICMRA Statement about Confidence in Biosimilar Products (for Healthcare Professionals), INT’L 
COALITION MEDS. REG. AUTHORITIES, http://www.icmra.info/drupal/sites/default/files/2019-
07/ICMRA_statement_about_confidence_in_biosimilar_product_HCP.PDF [https://perma.cc/YKB6-
P4KF]. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2012). 
 32 Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV). 
 33 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(6) (2012). 
 34 Id. The standard of “interchangeability” is defined in the statute and is not the same as the use in 
common discourse of being substitutable. See id. § 262(k)(2) (defining interchangeability). 
 35 Id. § 262(k)(4)(A)(i)–(ii). 
 36 Id. § 262(k)(4)(B). 
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reached earlier) one year after commercial marketing.37 The FDA has not yet 
approved an interchangeable biosimilar.38 
C. Disparagement 
In the small-molecule setting, disparagement is not a concern. Brands 
are not likely to falsely injure near-identical generics, which garner sales not 
from advertising campaigns but from state laws that allow—and in many 
cases require—pharmacists to substitute generic versions of brand-name 
prescriptions.39 In contrast, the education of stakeholders is critical to the 
marketing of biologics and biosimilars,40 which has tempted biologic firms 
to engage in disparagement. 
There are four related categories of statements and omissions that 
biologic firms have made against biosimilars, none of which is consistent 
with the statute. The first category is the most dramatic. A January 2019 
Washington Post article quotes Philip Schneider, chairman of the Alliance 
for Safe Biologic Medicines’ international advisory board, as suggesting 
caution in a move to unbranded biologics “so we don’t end up with another 
thalidomide [which famously caused birth defects]” or “all the other things 
that happen when safety isn’t considered.”41 Offering another example in the 
fearmongering category, the article further quotes a patient advocate 
affiliated with the group, who stated that a switch from one drug to another 
“disrupts your continuity of care,” as “[y]ou could end up in an emergency 
room, or be[] hospitalized, or try[] other, less efficient treatments,” all of 
which “can exacerbate or flare your disease, bring[ing] it out of remission.”42 
 
 37 Id. § 262(k)(6) (specifying that exclusivity expires on earliest of one year after commercial 
marketing, 18 months after court judgment or dismissal in patent litigation, 42 months after approval if 
litigation pending, or 18 months after approval if applicant has not sued). 
 38 Biosimilar and Interchangeable Biologics: More Treatment Choices, FDA, 
https://www.fda.gov/consumers/consumer-updates/biosimilar-and-interchangeable-biologics-more-
treatment-choices [https://perma.cc/CBD5-KYF6].  
 39 See Michael A. Carrier, A Real-World Analysis of Pharmaceutical Settlements: The Missing 
Dimension of Product Hopping, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1009, 1017 (2010); Brad Weltman, Why Pharmaceutical 
Advertising Is Virtually Absent from the Web, ADWEEK (Nov. 2, 2016), 
http://www.adweek.com/news/advertising-branding/why-pharmaceutical-advertising-virtually-absent-
web-174393 [https://perma.cc/83XC-KA9H]. 
 40 See Awareness of Biosimilars Among U.S. Specialty Physicians Is High but New Survey Identifies 
Five Major Knowledge Gaps, BIOSIMILAR DEV. (Nov. 1, 2016), 
https://www.biosimilardevelopment.com/doc/awareness-biosimilars-specialty-physicians-survey-
identifies-knowledge-gaps-0001 [https://perma.cc/7SS5-SHMV]. 
 41 Christopher Rowland, ‘Marketers Are Having a Field Day’: Patients Stuck in Corporate Fight 
Against Generic Drugs, WASH. POST (Jan. 9, 2019, 8:00 PM), https://www.adweek.com/brand-
marketing/why-pharmaceutical-advertising-virtually-absent-web-174393/ [https://perma.cc/LR4W-
TP5K]. 
 42 Id. 
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The second group of assertions claims that the biosimilar acts 
differently from the reference product. In an Amgen YouTube video quoted 
in Pfizer’s citizen petition raising awareness of this issue, the company states 
that the two products “can behave differently in the body.”43 Amgen also 
tweeted: “Biologics or biosimilars? It’s not just apples to apples. While 
#biosimilars may be highly similar to their #biologic reference products, 
there’s still a chance that patients may react differently.”44 Janssen Biotech 
provides a similar, albeit more subtle, example. In a patient brochure, the 
company states that a patient “may be asked to switch to a biosimilar that 
works in a similar way to REMICADE,” but that “you and your doctor did a 
lot of fine tuning to get where you are now,” so “if your REMICADE® 
treatment is still working for you, talk to your doctor about staying on it.”45 
The third category is based on claims that the biosimilar is not identical 
to the reference product. The Amgen video mentioned above states that “no 
two biologic medicines are identical.”46 Similarly, Genentech’s website, 
again as discussed in the Pfizer citizen petition, states that “FDA requires a 
biosimilar to be highly similar, but not identical” to the reference product.47 
The fourth group emphasizes that biosimilars do not satisfy the standard 
of interchangeability. In the brochure mentioned above, Janssen states that 
“[e]ven though infliximab biosimilars are very similar to REMICADE®, that 
doesn’t mean they are interchangeable with REMICADE®.” Janssen also 
warned (in bolded statements) that “no infliximab biosimilar has been proven 
to be interchangeable with REMICADE®” and that “[t]he infliximab 
biosimilars are not approved as interchangeable with REMICADE®.”48 
Each of these four categories can constitute disparagement. The first—
consisting of threatening comparisons to Thalidomide and warnings of trips 
to the emergency room—needs no explanation. But each of the other 
categories also runs afoul of the statute’s requirements. The second 
category—that the biosimilar acts differently—fails to mention that the FDA 
only approves a biosimilar when it is “highly similar” to and has “no 
clinically meaningful differences” from the biologic product.49 In other 
words, the biologic and biosimilar products are required to have the same 
 
 43 PFIZER INC., CITIZEN PETITION TO FDA 8 (Aug. 22, 2018), https://www.bigmoleculewatch.com/
wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2018/08/Citizen_Petition_from_Pfizer.pdf [https://perma.cc/3YCG-5LN7]. 
 44 Id. at 7. 
 45 Id. at 8; Janssen Immunology, Remicade Infliximab Brochure (on file with author). 
 46  CITIZEN PETITION TO FDA, supra note 43 (citation omitted). 
 47 Id.; Biosimilars vs. Generics: What is the Difference?, EXAMINE BIOSIMILARS, 
https://www.examinebiosimilars.com/content/examinebiosimilars/en_us/biosimilars-vs-generics.html 
[https://perma.cc/DX9R-Z8GH] (internal citation omitted). 
 48 Remicade Infliximab Brochure, supra note 45; CITIZEN PETITION TO FDA, supra note 43, at 8. 
 49 42 U.S.C. § 262(i)(2). 
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safety and effectiveness profile.50 As the FDA explained in Draft Guidance 
issued in February 2020, “representations or suggestions that create an 
impression that a biosimilar is not highly similar to its reference product are 
likely to be false or misleading.”51 
Evidence from Europe, which has witnessed robust biosimilar market 
entry, has confirmed that more than “700 million patient days of treatment” 
demonstrated that “clinical outcomes with biosimilars match the outcomes 
of the reference biologics.”52 This evidence also has revealed that “patient[s] 
switching from the reference biologic to the biosimilar . . . is not of concern” 
since more than 14,000 switches resulted in “[n]o change in clinical 
outcomes.”53 As discussed below,54 disparaging statements, even if not 
completely false, are, at a minimum, deceptive in conveying the misleading 
interpretation that biosimilars have “clinically meaningful differences” from 
their reference biologics.55 
The third category—claiming that the biosimilar is not identical—
focuses on an issue that is irrelevant; in fact, it is “normal and expected 
within the manufacturing process” for even batches of biologic products 
themselves to reveal “[s]light differences.”56 In the Draft Guidance 
mentioned above, the FDA “remind[ed] firms that a biosimilar product is not 
required to be identical to the reference product” but that it need only be 
“highly similar to the reference product notwithstanding minor differences 
in clinically inactive components and that there are no clinically meaningful 
differences . . . in terms of safety, purity, and potency.”57  
Finally, for the fourth category, a biosimilar’s failure to attain 
interchangeability does not mean that it is less safe. For starters, this status 
only makes sense for biosimilars that will be dispensed at the pharmacy 
 
 50 Patient Materials, FDA, https://www.fda.gov/drugs/biosimilars/patient-materials 
[https://perma.cc/AHW4-NJXF]. 
 51 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., PROMOTIONAL LABELING AND ADVERTISING CONSIDERATIONS FOR 
PRESCRIPTION BIOLOGICAL REFERENCE AND BIOSIMILAR PRODUCTS QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS: DRAFT 
GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY 6 (Feb. 2020), https://www.fda.gov/regulatory-information/search-fda-
guidance-documents/promotional-labeling-and-advertising-considerations-prescription-biological-
reference-and-biosimilar [https://perma.cc/LHL9-KQWF] [hereinafter PROMOTIONAL LABELING AND 
ADVERTISING CONSIDERATIONS]. 
 52 BIOSIMILARS FORUM, STRUCTURAL MARKET CHANGES NEEDED IN U.S. TO ACHIEVE COST-
SAVINGS FROM BIOSIMILARS 8 (Mar. 19, 2019), 
http://biosimilarsforum.org/PDF/BIosimilars_WhitePaper-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/QV4L-DEPV]. 
 53 Id. 
 54 See infra notes 151–156 and accompanying text. 
 55 42 U.S.C. § 262(i)(2) (defining biosimilars as having no clinically meaningful differences). 
 56 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., BIOLOGICAL PRODUCT DEFINITIONS 1, 
https://www.fda.gov/files/drugs/published/Biological-Product-Definitions.pdf [https://perma.cc/7RWA-
SZYX]. 
 57 PROMOTIONAL LABELING AND ADVERTISING CONSIDERATIONS, supra note 51, at 7–8. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W  O N L I N E 
128 
counter (where substitution takes place), but each of the 15 biosimilars that 
has entered the U.S. market is dispensed in a hospital or infusion center.58 
More fundamentally, as Pfizer pointed out in its citizen petition, its 
biosimilar “demonstrated that a single switch does not result in different 
safety or efficacy.”59 As the statement from the global regulatory authorities 
explained, “[a] full clinical development program[] is not necessary when 
extensive laboratory testing has demonstrated that the biosimilar is highly 
similar to the originator.”60 And as Boehringer Ingelheim explained in 
supporting Pfizer’s petition, “an FDA interchangeability designation is 
irrelevant” for “the majority of biologics . . . administered to the patient by 
the physician who has written the prescription,” with “misinformation . . . 
generated” to “impl[y] that interchangeable biologics are ‘better 
biosimilars’ . . . rather than the same biosimilar on which additional data has 
been generated.”61 
II. REGULATORY SETTING 
How should courts analyze the antitrust effects of biologic firms’ 
disparagement of biosimilars? This Part sets the stage for the antitrust 
analysis by discussing the importance of the regulatory regime, showing the 
regime’s ineffectiveness, and highlighting the significant barriers to entry 
facing biosimilars. 
By brief way of background, the antitrust framework that applies to a 
single firm acting unilaterally is monopolization. This offense requires a 
showing of monopoly power and exclusionary conduct.62 Monopoly power 
is “the power to control prices or exclude competition.”63 Biologic firms that 
disparage biosimilars are likely to satisfy this element because of their ability 
 
 58 Sean McGowan, Five Years On, Biosimilars Need Support From All Health Care Players, STAT 
(Mar. 6, 2020), https://www.statnews.com/2020/03/06/biosimilars-in-us-turn-five/ [https://perma.cc/
4LMG-BDJR]; see Patient Materials, supra note 50; Ana Rose Welch, Biosimilars and the Site of Care: 
Current Considerations, BIOSIMILAR DEV. (Mar. 26, 2019), https://www.biosimilardevelopment.com/
doc/biosimilars-and-the-site-of-care-current-considerations-0001 [https://perma.cc/8RZN-QXXT]. 
 59 See CITIZEN PETITION TO FDA, supra note 43, at 8 n.34 (citing clinical trials sponsored by the 
Norwegian government). 
 60 ICMRA Statement, supra note 29 (finding that when a biosimilar is “highly similar” to the 
originator it can be “approved for the same indications as the originator on the basis of the established 
efficacy and safety of the originator”). 
 61 See Boehringer Letter, supra note 28, at 5. 
 62 See, e.g., United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966). 
 63 United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956). 
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to charge and sustain supracompetitive prices in a market characterized by 
significant barriers to entry.64 
In contrast to monopoly power, the caselaw on exclusionary conduct is 
less clear. Courts often distinguish between the “willful acquisition or 
maintenance of [monopoly] power” and “growth or development as a 
consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident.”65 
Considering the regulatory regime can shed critical light on the issue of 
exclusionary conduct. 
A. Regulatory Regime 
As the Supreme Court explained in Verizon Communications v. Trinko, 
the starting point for antitrust analysis is the regulatory regime. The Court 
stated that antitrust analysis must take “careful account” of “the pervasive 
federal and state regulation characteristic of the industry” and “recognize and 
reflect the distinctive economic and legal setting of the regulated industry to 
which it applies.”66 
The Court in Trinko considered not just the existence of a regulatory 
regime, but also its effectiveness. In Trinko, the regime was working: phone 
companies providing local service were required to “be on good behavior” 
and not to discriminate in providing access before entering the long-distance 
market.67 Firms that did not satisfy these conditions were subject to financial 
penalties, weekly reporting requirements, or the suspension or revocation of 
long-distance approval.68 
In contrast, regulatory abuse has prevented the biologics regime from 
operating as intended. The combination of ineffective FDA regulation and 
high barriers to entry ensures a role for antitrust.69 
 
 64 Such price increases offer direct proof of monopoly power. Courts also consider indirect proof in 
the form of a defendant’s share of the relevant market. See, e.g., In re Nexium (Esomeprazole) Antitrust 
Litig., 968 F. Supp. 2d 367, 388 n.19 (D. Mass. 2013) (finding “direct evidence of market power” in 
allegations that brand firm “had the power to maintain the price of the drug . . . at supracompetitive levels 
without losing substantial sales to other products” and that the drug “enjoyed high barriers to entry”). 
 65  Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 570–71. 
 66 Verizon Comm. Inc. v. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 411 (2004) (internal citations omitted). 
 67 Id. at 412. 
 68 Id. at 413. 
 69 See Herbert Hovenkamp, FRAND and Antitrust, 105 CORNELL L. REV. 101, 140 (2020) (“Many 
federal antitrust violations are also breaches of contract, torts, or violations of some other body of law . . . 
[and] [t]he remedy in these cases is not to dismiss one or the other claim . . . .”). 
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B. Ineffective Regulation 
Biosimilar competition in the United States is far from robust. In 
Europe, 59 biosimilars have received approval.70 In the United States, 27 
biosimilars have been approved (with more than half the approvals occurring 
since July 2018).71 In addition, U.S. biosimilars have offered savings of only 
15% to 35% (typically on the lower end), far less than the more significant 
(often 70%) discounts in Europe.72 
The weak U.S. biosimilar market is not the consequence of the FDA’s 
lack of effort. In its citizen petition, Pfizer pointed to “various initiatives” the 
agency had undertaken “aimed at encouraging and facilitating the 
development and approval of biosimilars.”73 Such activities included “the 
numerous biosimilar-related guidance documents FDA has issued, the 
Agency’s development and distribution of educational materials . . . , the 
Agency’s Biosimilar User Fee Act performance goals, and the . . . 
Biosimilars Action Plan.”74 
Despite these efforts, FDA officials have expressed frustration with the 
lack of biosimilar competition. In 2018, Former Commissioner Scott 
Gottlieb “worried” that the market for biosimilars “still isn’t established” and 
that “[t]he ability for these products to penetrate clinical practice, and gain 
acceptance, is still not firm.”75 In addition, Gottlieb lamented that biosimilar 
 
 70 Aydin Harston, How the U.S. Compares to Europe on Biosimilar Approvals and Products in the 
Pipeline, ROTHWELL FIGG (May 7, 2019), https://www.biosimilarsip.com/2019/05/07/how-the-u-s-
compares-to-europe-on-biosimilar-approvals-and-products-in-the-pipeline-4/ [https://perma.cc/AAY4-
JRFD]. 
 71 Biosimilar Product Information, FDA (June 11, 2020), 
https://www.fda.gov/drugs/biosimilars/biosimilar-product-information [https://perma.cc/ST4Z-H2C6]. 
Until recently, significantly more biosimilars had entered the market in Europe, but that gap has closed. 
See Per Troein, Max Newton, Jyoti Patel & Kirstie Scott, THE IMPACT OF BIOSIMILAR COMPETITION IN 
EUROPE, IQVIA 4 (Oct. 2019), 
https://ec.europa.eu/docsroom/documents/38461/attachments/1/translations/en/renditions/native 
[https://perma.cc/976B-YUVY] (16 biosimilars launched in Europe as of 2018); McGowan, supra note 
58 (15 biosimilars marketed in U.S. as of 2020). The European regime differs from the U.S. in various 
ways, but when given the option, doctors have more frequently prescribed (and patients have more 
frequently taken) biosimilars. See Samantha DiGrande, European Report Finds Generics and Biosimilars 
Key to Curbing Wasteful Drug Spending, AJMC (Nov. 27, 2018), 
https://www.centerforbiosimilars.com/news/european-report-finds-generics-and-biosimilars-key-to-
curbing-wasteful-drug-spending [https://perma.cc/P5NP-QWAQ] (noting that certain European countries 
have incentives for physicians to prescribe biosimilars). 
 72 JOINT STATEMENT, supra note 13, at 2; Ying Chen, Jennifer Dikan, Jennifer Heller & Jorge Santos 
da Silva, Five Things to Know About Biosimilars Right Now, MCKINSEY & CO. (July 17, 2018), 
https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/pharmaceuticals-and-medical-products/our-insights/five-things-
to-know-about-biosimilars-right-now [https://perma.cc/RFC3-XAR9]. 
 73 CITIZEN PETITION TO FDA, supra note 43, at 2. 
 74 Id. 
 75 Remarks from FDA Commissioner, supra note 1. 
115:119 (2020) Don't Die! 
131 
competition is “anemic” and that “the real savings” from biosimilars have 
been “just a fraction of even the most conservative initial estimates.”76 In 
fact, the agency found that “if Americans had the opportunity to purchase 
successfully marketed, FDA-approved biosimilar prescription drugs, they 
could have saved more than $4.5 billion in 2017.”77 Such savings, however, 
will not come to fruition if biologic companies “unfairly delay or derail the 
entry of biosimilar competitors” through conduct (discussed in the next Part) 
such as patent thickets and anticompetitive contracts.78 Gottlieb expressed 
further concern “that the biosimilar manufacturers may pull out” if biologics 
“are able to lock up markets even in cases where there’s a fully 
interchangeable competitor.”79 
Even more on point, Gottlieb “worried” that “there are either deliberate 
or unintentional efforts by branded companies to create confusion” about 
biosimilars’ safety and effectiveness.80 These messages “can potentially 
undermine consumer confidence in biosimilars in ways that are untrue” and 
“negatively impact a patient’s judgment about an otherwise safe and 
effective product.”81 The FDA and FTC reiterated these concerns in a joint 
statement in February 2020 in which they explained that they “support 
competitive markets for biologics” and “have serious concerns about false 
or misleading statements and their negative impacts on public health and 
competition.”82 
Compounding the regulatory regime’s inability to effectuate robust 
biosimilar competition is the FDA’s failure to (1) approve an interchangeable 
or (2) explain the lack of safety consequences from the absence of an 
interchangeability designation.83 As the disparagement examples above 
show,84 this vacuum has led to assumptions that biosimilars are unsafe as 
none have attained the highest standard of substitutability. This 
misunderstanding fails to recognize that—even if not as much data is 
 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Hillel P. Cohen & Dorothy McCabe, Combatting Misinformation on Biosimilars and Preparing 
the Market for Them Can Save the U.S. Billions, STAT (June 19, 2019), 
https://www.statnews.com/2019/06/19/misinformation-biosimilars-market-preparation/ 
[https://perma.cc/DE2U-Q7GX]. 
 81 Id.  
 82 JOINT STATEMENT, supra note 13, at 3. 
 83 Draft FDA guidance would begin to address this in explaining that “promotional materials for a 
reference product should avoid representing or suggesting that a biosimilar product is less safe or effective 
than its reference product because it has not been licensed as interchangeable with the reference product.” 
PROMOTIONAL LABELING AND ADVERTISING CONSIDERATIONS, supra note 51, at 7. 
 84 See supra Section I.C. 
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generated—a finding of biosimilarity is sufficient for patients to have 
complete confidence that the product is safe and will work as effectively as 
the reference biologic. For if a biosimilar was any less safe or effective, the 
FDA never would have approved it in the first place. 
C. Barriers to Entry 
Exacerbating the regulatory regime’s ineffectiveness are multiple 
barriers to entry that have limited the number of U.S. biosimilars, including 
development costs, patent thickets, anticompetitive contracts, and 
established patients. 
The first barrier to entry is the cost of developing biosimilars. As 
discussed above,85 biosimilar manufacturers face significant development 
hurdles. Not only are the products complex, but key inputs are also hidden 
behind trade secrets and opaque manufacturing processes. As a result, unlike 
generics, which cost an average of $5 million to bring to market, biosimilar 
development involves more intensive and uncertain research and 
development, which could result in costs of at least $100 million.86 
A second hurdle involves vast patent thickets that biologic companies 
have put together. For example, AbbVie has more than 100 patents covering 
anti-inflammatory-treating Humira, including more than 50 obtained in 2015 
and 2016 combined, just before the patent on the medicine’s active 
ingredient expired.87 Similarly, Johnson & Johnson (J&J) has more than 100 
patents covering the anti-inflammatory medication Remicade.88 Biosimilar 
manufacturers are not able to get around such massive portfolios.89 
A third barrier involves an array of conduct by which biologic firms 
have bundled products, employed exclusive dealing, and used rebates to 
make it harder for rivals to obtain a foothold in the market. Pfizer described 
this conduct in its lawsuit challenging J&J’s protection of its biologic 
 
 85 See supra Section I.A. 
 86 BIOSIMILARS FORUM, QUANTIFYING THE VALUE OF BIOSIMILARS 2 (2018), 
http://biosimilarsforum.org/PDFs/Biosims%20Value%20Whitepaper%202018-0614_Revised_2018-
0712.pdf [https://perma.cc/L7WX-R829]; Scott Gottlieb, How Obama’s FDA Keeps Generic Drugs Off 
the Market, 113 MO. MED. 444, 444 (2016); Henry G. Grabowski, David B. Ridley, Kevin A. Schulman 
& Tomas J. Philipson, Entry and Competition in Generic Biologics, 28 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 
439, 443 (2007). 
 87 Cynthia Koons, This Shield of Patents Protects the World’s Best-Selling Drug, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK (Sep. 7, 2017, 5:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-09-07/this-
shield-of-patents-protects-the-world-s-best-selling-drug [https://perma.cc/GPW7-VUZ4]. 
 88 Id. 
 89 See, e.g., RICHARD GONZALEZ, ABBVIE LONG-TERM STRATEGY 14 (Oct. 30, 2015),  
http://www.biotechduediligence.com/uploads/6/3/6/7/6367956/abbvie_strategy_presentation__1_.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/VQ8Y-47HW] (listing categories of drugs making up “Broad U.S. Humira Patent 
Estate”). 
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Remicade at the expense of Pfizer’s rival Inflectra.90 Pfizer challenged J&J’s 
exclusive contracts, made up of (1) “express terms that would exclude 
biosimilars” from “medical policies and drug formularies” and (2) “fail first” 
provisions, which “require a patient to first try and fail on Remicade before 
the insurance company would reimburse Inflectra or another biosimilar.”91 
Pfizer also claimed that J&J “bundled rebates across multiple products,” 
forcing insurers to “pay a higher price on other [J&J] products” if they 
“refuse[d] to grant exclusivity to Remicade.”92 
The fourth and final barrier is presented by established patients. These 
“incontestable patients” “represent inelastic demand” as they are “‘highly 
unlikely’ to [switch] to a biosimilar,” even in response to a price increase.93 
For that reason, Pfizer challenged J&J’s “all-or-nothing” program, which 
“bundles the base of existing Remicade patients with new patients.”94 By 
“premising rebates on this incontestable population,” J&J sought to use a 
“rebate trap,” forcing insurers to “exclude Inflectra from competing for new 
patients.”95   
*    *    * 
The combined effect of these entry barriers exacerbates the problem. 
The cost of development limits the universe of biosimilars, and patent 
thickets make it extremely difficult to enter many markets. Existing patients 
are difficult to move to new medicines—even when they are more 
affordable. Rebates, bundling, and exclusive dealing threaten to link existing 
and new patients together. And on top of these existing barriers, 
disparagement dissuades the remaining new patients, taking away what 
should be the most receptive segment of the market: those not locked into 
existing regimens. Before determining if disparagement violates antitrust 
law, the next Part analyzes the approaches courts have applied to this 
conduct. 
III. CASELAW 
In analyzing the antitrust effects of disparagement, courts have adopted 
one of three approaches. This Part discusses the three: no-liability, de 
minimis, and case-by-case analyses. 
 
 90 Pfizer Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 333 F. Supp. 3d 494, 498–99 (E.D. Pa. 2018). 
 91 Id. Fail first provisions are essentially a form of exclusive dealing since “if a patient fails first on 
Remicade, it would ‘defy sound medical judgment’ for a physician to switch to a therapeutic equivalent 
biosimilar, such as Inflectra, rather than try another therapy.” Id. 
 92 Id. at 499. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. 
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A. No-Liability 
The first approach, which has been applied by the Fifth and Seventh 
Circuits, reasons that false statements enhance competition in advertising 
markets and thus that disparagement-based antitrust claims are not 
actionable. For example, the Fifth Circuit has drawn a distinction between 
“business torts, which harm competitors, and truly anticompetitive activities, 
which harm the market.”96 It has also stated that “absent a demonstration that 
a competitor’s false advertisements had the potential to eliminate, or did in 
fact eliminate, competition, an antitrust lawsuit will not lie.”97 Similarly, the 
Seventh Circuit stated bluntly that “[c]ommercial speech is not actionable 
under the antitrust laws.”98 In particular, this court asserted that “[a]ntitrust 
law condemns practices that drive up prices by curtailing output,” 
distinguishing “[f]alse statements about a rival’s goods [that] do not curtail 
output in either the short or long run,” but instead “just set the stage for 
competition in a different venue: the advertising market.”99 
This hands-off approach is not persuasive. There is not such a “rigid 
distinction” between “business torts, which harm competitors, and truly 
anticompetitive activities, which harm the market.”100 Deceptive statements 
could depress demand for the criticized product, thereby reducing output and 
increasing price.101 Many false statements are made about the defendant’s 
own products, with false superiority claims discouraging consumers from 
using any competitor’s products.102 More fundamentally, misleading 
advertising forces competitors to fight back on unfair ground, expending 
resources defending truth against falsehood instead of investing them 
elsewhere, harming their overall ability to compete. And as Professor 
Rebecca Tushnet has written, “corrective advertising, especially by an 
 
 96 Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 842 F.3d 883, 895 (5th Cir. 2016). 
 97 Id. 
 98 Sanderson v. Culligan Int’l Co., 415 F.3d 620, 624 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 99 Id. at 623. 
 100 Shubha Ghosh, The Antitrust Logic of Biologics, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. ONLINE 46, 53 (2018) 
(citing Retractable Techs., 842 F.3d at 895). 
 101 See Kevin S. Marshall, Product Disparagement Under the Sherman Act, Its Nurturing and 
Injurious Effects to Competition, and the Tension Between Jurisprudential Economics and 
Microeconomics, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 231, 253 (2006) (finding it “short-sighted to conclude that 
the intentional dissemination of false information about a rival’s product does not constitute a restraint of 
trade” since it “restrains the autonomous forces of supply and demand, and is therefore injurious to 
competition”). 
 102 See, e.g., Michael A. Carrier & Rebecca Tushnet, An Antitrust Framework for False Advertising 
106 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 3, 11), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3593914 [https://perma.cc/L2BA-EL2A] 
(describing AT&T’s false promise of “unlimited” data, which discouraged consumers from using rivals). 
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inherently-less-credible-because-self-interested competitor, is unlikely to fix 
all the damage of false advertising.”103 
By engaging in deception, a company—in particular, a monopolist—
could entrench its position in the market. And this conduct could (based on 
the dichotomy drawn in a leading Supreme Court monopolization case) 
resemble more the “willful acquisition or maintenance of [monopoly] 
power” than a “superior product, business acumen, or historic accident.”104 
Or the deception, applying another landmark case, could be viewed as 
“tend[ing] to impair the opportunities of rivals” and “not further[ing] 
competition on the merits.”105 
B. De Minimis 
The second approach, represented by the Second, Sixth, Ninth, Tenth, 
and Eleventh Circuits, applies a presumption that the exclusionary effects of 
disparagement are de minimis.106 The plaintiff can rebut such a presumption 
by showing that the alleged anticompetitive conduct is (1) clearly false, (2) 
clearly material, (3) clearly likely to induce reasonable reliance, (4) made to 
buyers without knowledge of the subject matter, (5) continued for prolonged 
periods, and (6) not readily susceptible to neutralization or other offsets by 
rivals.107 Courts are not consistent on whether a plaintiff must show each of 
the six factors.108 
In creating such strict requirements, the framework ensures that the vast 
majority of false advertising, perpetuated by firms lacking market power, 
does not automatically violate antitrust law. But it overshoots the mark in 
making it nearly impossible to find antitrust liability even for monopolists 
bringing about substantial competitive harm. 
 
 103 Rebecca Tushnet, Fifth Circuit Reverses Multimillion-Dollar Antitrust Verdict Based on False 
Advertising, Remands, REBECCA TUSHNET (Dec. 6, 2016), https://tushnet.com/2016/12/06/fifth-circuit-
reverses-multimillion-dollar-antitrust-verdict-based-on-false-advertising-remands-2/ 
[https://perma.cc/5BS7-CQFC]. 
 104 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966). 
 105 Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 605 n.32 (1985) (quotation 
omitted). For additional critiques of the no-liability approach, see also Carrier & Tushnet, supra note 102, 
at 10–13. 
 106 See Duty Free Ams., Inc. v. Estée Lauder Cos., 797 F.3d 1248, 1268–69 (11th Cir. 2015); Lenox 
MacLaren Surgical Corp. v. Medtronic, Inc., 762 F.3d 1114, 1127–28 (10th Cir. 2014); Am. Council of 
Certified Podiatric Physicians & Surgeons v. Am. Bd. of Podiatric Surgery, Inc., 323 F.3d 366, 370 (6th 
Cir. 2003); Am. Prof’l Testing Serv., Inc. v. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Legal & Prof’l Publ’ns, Inc., 
108 F.3d 1147, 1152 (9th Cir. 1997); Nat’l Ass’n of Pharm. Mfrs., Inc. v. Ayerst Labs., 850 F.2d 904, 
916 (2d Cir. 1988). 
 107 Duty Free Ams., 797 F.3d at 1269. 
 108 See, e.g., Am. Council of Certified Podiatric Physicians & Surgeons, 323 F.3d at 371 (“We 
decline to consider each element or hold that all elements must be satisfied to rebut the de minimis 
presumption.”). 
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In assessing the appropriateness of the de minimis factors, it is worth 
considering false advertising law, which offers a ready-made template for 
assessing the harmful effects of false and misleading advertising. For an 
advertisement to be actionable, it must contain false or misleading statements 
that are material, that deceive or are likely to deceive consumers, and that 
cause or are likely to cause harm to the plaintiff.109 
Considering false advertising law raises questions about the propriety 
of the factors making up the de minimis framework. For example, a clear 
falsity requirement does not reflect false advertising’s concern with 
misleading statements, which could be literally true or ambiguous but still 
induce consumers to reach false conclusions.110 In fact, “[c]onsumers are less 
likely to argue against associations they came up with themselves, and more 
likely to remember and act on them.”111 Additionally, reasonable reliance 
duplicates false advertisement’s materiality factor while overemphasizing 
the fraud-like idea—not present in false advertising law—of “reasonable” 
reliance. Nor do the other factors in the de minimis test capture the reality of 
false advertising, which is not readily susceptible to neutralization and which 
can still be effective even if directed to buyers with knowledge of the subject 
matter. In short, in departing from the basics of false advertising law, the de 
minimis framework raises questions.112 Despite these shortcomings, because 
it represents the state of the law in many courts, I take the de minimis test as 
a given in this piece. 
A case from the medical device industry, Lenox MacLaren Surgical 
Corp. v. Medtronic,113 provides one potential guidepost for analysis based on 
the de minimis approach. In that case, Lenox, a manufacturer of bone mills 
used in spinal-fusion surgery,114 entered into an agreement by which 
Medtronic distributed the product to hospitals.115 After the agreement broke 
down, Lenox alleged that Medtronic engaged in disparagement that 
 
 109 See Carrier & Tushnet, supra note 102, at 7. 
 110 See, e.g., Hickson Corp. v. N. Crossarm Co., 357 F.3d 1256, 1260 (11th Cir. 2004); Fed. Trade 
Comm’n v. Roca Labs, Inc., 345 F. Supp. 3d 1375, 1386 (M.D. Fla. 2018). 
 111 Edward F. McQuarrie & Barbara J. Phillips, Indirect Persuasion in Advertising: How Consumers 





 112 For additional critiques of the test, see Carrier & Tushnet, supra note 102, at 13–20. 
 113 762 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2014). 
 114 Bone mills grind up bones to be used in surgery. See generally Med Device Monday: Bone Mills, 
ACKNOWLEDGE REG. STRATEGIES (May 30, 2017), https://www.acknowledge-
rs.com/blog/2017/5/29/med-device-monday-bone-mills [https://perma.cc/HWS2-FJTA]. 
 115 Lenox, 762 F.3d at 1116. 
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constituted monopolization by telling potential customers that its device was 
dangerous and helping to initiate a recall.116 Applying the six-factor test, the 
Tenth Circuit found that Lenox offered evidence to rebut the presumption of 
a de minimis impact on competition.117 
The court’s discussion of three of the six factors is instructive.118 For the 
fourth factor, whether the alleged statement was made to buyers without 
knowledge of the subject matter, the court found that “even sophisticated 
consumers [like hospitals and group purchasing organizations] would rely 
on Medtronic’s false statements.”119 For the fifth factor, whether the false 
statement continued for prolonged periods, the court found that the continued 
listing of Lenox’s device on the FDA’s website as recalled was enough to 
show a prolonged period.120 And the court found the sixth factor, whether the 
plaintiff could show that it could not readily neutralize the disparaging 
statement, was satisfied from “worries involving malpractice liability,” 
which resulted in “hospitals [being] unwilling to purchase” recalled 
products.121 The Lenox case offers a roadmap for how a plaintiff can satisfy 
this framework. 
C. Case-by-Case 
A third group of courts, led by the Third, Eighth, and D.C. Circuits, 
takes a case-by-case approach in assessing whether the alleged 
disparagement violates antitrust law. For example, the Third Circuit has 
explained that “anticompetitive conduct can include . . . making false 
statements about a rival to potential investors and customers” and that 
“defamation, which plainly is not competition on the merits, can give rise to 
antitrust liability, especially when it is combined with other anticompetitive 
acts.”122 Similarly, the D.C. Circuit has recognized that “fraudulent 
misrepresentations” are “well within” the universe of anticompetitive 
conduct.123 And the Eighth Circuit has explained that an alleged monopolist’s 
“full frontal attack” that “(1) used false, misleading and deceptive 
advertising and (2) was directed at (a) consumers and (b) travel agents” 
 
 116 Id. at 1126–27. 
 117 Id. at 1128. 
 118 For the first three factors, the district court adopted the findings of an arbitration panel that had 
found that the conduct was false, was material, and induced reliance. Lenox MacLaren Surgical Corp. v. 
Medtronic, Inc., No. 10-cv-02139-RPM-BNB, 2013 WL 3179204, at *6 (D. Colo. June 21, 2013), rev’d 
on other grounds and aff’d on the grounds discussed, 762 F.3d 1114, 1130 (10th Cir. 2014). 
 119 Lenox, 762 F.3d at 1127. 
 120 Id. 
 121 Id. 
 122 W. Penn. Allegheny Health Sys., Inc. v. UPMC, 627 F.3d 85, 109 n.14 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 123 Caribbean Broad. Sys., Ltd. v. Cable & Wireless PLC, 148 F.3d 1080, 1087 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
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demonstrated an unreasonable restraint because of its “purpose of preventing 
any effective competition.”124 
Courts applying the case-by-case approach have appreciated that 
anticompetitive conduct takes “too many different forms, and is too 
dependent upon context, for any court or commentator ever to have 
enumerated all the varieties.”125 Under this approach, one relevant factor 
could be the role the conduct plays in a competitor’s ability to finance high 
expenses. In one case, for example, the Third Circuit determined that false 
statements to investors about a competitor’s financial health caused the rival 
to pay inflated financing costs on its debt and, in combination with other 
actions, demonstrated anticompetitive conduct sufficient to survive a motion 
to dismiss.126 
A second factor that courts have analyzed under the case-by-case 
approach is the extent to which false statements lock in decision-making. In 
United States v. Microsoft Corp., for example, the D.C. Circuit found that 
deceptive statements to Java-based software developers about the 
interoperability of Windows-based systems with other platforms resulted in 
the inadvertent development of software compatible only with Windows and 
demonstrated anticompetitive conduct.127 
Though courts have considered the two factors mentioned above, the 
case-by-case analyses apply a totality of the circumstances approach. By 
analyzing conduct as a whole without requiring a showing exceeding de 
minimis harm, this approach offers flexibility for biosimilar manufacturers 
bringing disparagement claims. 
*    *    * 
In sum, antitrust courts apply three very different frameworks when 
considering deception-based claims. The first, unjustifiable approach, 
abandons antitrust liability. The other two, considered more fully in the next 
Part, apply the strict standards of the de minimis framework and the more 
flexible standards of the case-by-case approach. 
 
 124 Int’l Travel Arrangers, Inc. v. W. Airlines, Inc., 623 F.2d 1255, 1268 (8th Cir. 1980). 
 125 E.g., Caribbean Broad. Sys., 148 F.3d at 1087 (quoted in LePage’s Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 152 
(3d Cir. 2003)). 
 126 W. Penn. Allegheny, 627 F.3d at 109–10. 
 127 253 F.3d 34, 76–77 (D.C. Cir. 2001). The FTC challenged similar conduct in its lawsuit against 
(and settlement with) Intel for its “deceptive acts and practices that misled consumers and the public.” 
Complaint at ¶ 10, In re Intel Corp., Dkt. No. 9341 (F.T.C. Dec. 16, 2009). In particular, the agency 
alleged that “Intel expressly or by implication falsely misrepresented that industry benchmarks reflected 
the performance of its [products] relative to its competitors’ products” and “pressure[d] independent 
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competitor’s products’ names or logs, even though these competitor microprocessor products were 
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IV. ANTITRUST VIOLATION 
Biologic manufacturers’ disparagement of biosimilars can violate 
antitrust law. This Part shows how biologics typically have monopoly power. 
It then applies the two primary judicial approaches to the conduct, finding 
that monopolization is likely under both the de minimis and case-by-case 
approaches.128 
As an initial matter, as applied to monopolists’ deceptive conduct, 
antitrust law offers unique advantages over false advertising law.129 For 
example, as compared to false advertising law, antitrust offers more powerful 
remedies of treble damages, automatic (as opposed to exceptional) attorneys’ 
fees,130 and injunctive relief preventing the behavior’s continuation,131 as well 
as a more expansive universe of potential plaintiffs, all of which promise to 
provide robust deterrence. 
A. Monopoly Power 
A monopolization case consists of monopoly power and exclusionary 
conduct.132 The first element is monopoly power, which courts have defined 
as “the power to control prices or exclude competition.”133 Monopoly power 
can be shown in one of two ways. First, it can be proved indirectly by 
examining a defendant’s market share along with barriers to entry that could 
entrench that market position.134 Courts regularly hold that a 90% market 
share supports monopoly power, with some courts finding a 75% share to be 
sufficient.135 
 
 128 The showing of an antitrust violation under Section 2 of the Sherman Act also provides support 
for the easier-to-satisfy standard of FTC Act Section 5, which targets unfair methods of competition. 
15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012). 
 129 See generally Carrier & Tushnet, supra note 102, at 22–25 (explaining that antitrust offers more 
powerful remedies and contemplates a broader array of potential plaintiffs). 
 130 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (2012). 
 131 Carrier & Tushnet, supra note 102, at 24 (“While a Lanham Act false advertising injunction 
generally is limited to the specific false claims that have been proven, an antitrust injunction could more 
generally target false advertising and marketwide harm to competition.”). 
 132 E.g., United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966). This and the next two 
paragraphs are adapted from Michael A. Carrier, Sharing, Samples, and Generics: An Antitrust 
Framework, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 21–22 (2017). 
 133 United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956). 
 134 See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS 
PRACTICE 359–60 (5th ed. 2016). 
 135 Id. at 357. 
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Second, a plaintiff can prove monopoly power directly,136 such as when 
a brand firm is able to “maintain the price of [a] drug . . . at supracompetitive 
levels without losing substantial sales . . . .”137 Direct proof of monopoly 
power can also consist of observable effects on the market such as a price 
increase or output reduction.138 
The Supreme Court has held that a market can consist of a single 
product.139 Lower courts have also found that a single drug can constitute its 
own market, which has led naturally to the conclusion that a single drug can 
have monopoly power.140 Where potential purchasers have no alternative to 
using a drug, monopoly power is likely. 
Biologics are likely to have monopoly power. There has been very 
limited entry of biosimilars in the United States. Biologics make up 7 of the 
top 10 highest-selling drugs in the country.141 And manufacturers charge 
astronomical prices, as much as hundreds of thousands of dollars per year 
for a product.142 Even though biologics make up less than 2% of the market, 
they represent 40% of prescription drug spending.143 Pfizer offered one 
example of monopoly power in its lawsuit against J&J, claiming that J&J’s 
10% price increase did not affect its 96% market share, with 90% of 
providers refusing to stock Pfizer’s competing product.144 
Given biologics’ control over markets and ability to charge high prices 
without suffering losses, a plaintiff should be able to demonstrate that the 
 
 136 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 69–70 (7th ed. 2012) 
(noting that “direct proof has provided the basis for findings of substantial anticompetitive effects in some 
prominent cases”). 
 137 In re Nexium (Esomeprazole) Antitrust Litig., 968 F. Supp. 2d 367, 388 n.19 (D. Mass. 2013); 
see also In re Aggrenox Antitrust Litig., 94 F. Supp. 3d 224, 246 (D. Conn. 2015) (recognizing that direct 
evidence can establish market power). 
 138 Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 307 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 139 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 481–82 (1992). 
 140 E.g., In re Nexium, 968 F. Supp. 2d at 388 (rejecting defendants’ claim that “other drugs may be 
used to treat heartburn”); In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 352 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1319 n.40 
(S.D. Fla. 2005) (relevant market composed of brand and generic terazosin hydrochloride); In re 
Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 105 F. Supp. 2d 618, 680-81 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (holding that brand and 
generic versions of heart medication with chemical compound diltiazem hydrochloride constitute a single 
market). 
 141 Kyle Blankenship, The Top 20 Drugs by 2018 U.S. Sales, FIERCE PHARMA (Jun. 17, 2019, 7:00 
AM), https://www.fiercepharma.com/special-report/top-20-drugs-by-2018-u-s-sales [https://perma.cc
/7VBC-RVTK] (Humira, Revlimid, Enbrel, Rituxan, Opdivo, Eylea, Neulasta). 
 142 Sameer Awsare, The Price Is Wrong, PERMANENTE MED. (Feb. 19, 2019), 
https://permanente.org/the-price-is-wrong/ [https://perma.cc/66M6-FADB]. 
 143 Remarks from FDA Commissioner, supra note 1. 
 144 Pfizer Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 333 F. Supp. 3d 494, 499–500 (E.D. Pa. 2018). 
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products have monopoly power.145 Having satisfied monopoly power, the 
next element is exclusionary conduct. As discussed above,146 the Fifth and 
Seventh Circuits would not find liability under the first approach. But that is 
only because they abandon antitrust analysis. That is not a justifiable 
approach. Disparagement could cement a biologic’s status as an 
unchallenged monopolist. And as confirmed by the various barriers to entry 
discussed above,147 the biologic would not easily lose that monopoly 
position. 
B. De Minimis 
The Second, Sixth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits apply the de 
minimis framework to deception-based conduct. As discussed above,148 
courts applying this framework presume that the exclusionary effects of 
disparagement are de minimis. The plaintiff can rebut such a presumption by 
showing that the alleged anticompetitive conduct is (1) clearly false, (2) 
clearly material, (3) clearly likely to induce reasonable reliance, (4) made to 
buyers without knowledge of subject matter, (5) continued for prolonged 
periods, and (6) not readily susceptible to neutralization or other offsets by 
rivals.149 The remainder of this Section applies the framework.150 
The first factor requires clear falsity. It is unclear exactly what counts 
as “clearly false.” But the relevant underlying law, false advertising, targets 
not only false, but also misleading, conduct.151 And, given that the FTC is the 
government agency most directly focused on challenging or misleading 
deceptive conduct, its analysis is particularly instructive. In a policy 
statement, the FTC explained that deception can involve “omission of 
material information, the disclosure of which is necessary to prevent the 
claim . . . from being misleading.”152 Ensuring a robust interpretation, the 
FTC made clear that when a seller’s representation “conveys more than one 
meaning to reasonable consumers, one of which is false, the seller is liable 
 
 145 Even easier to satisfy would be an attempted monopolization claim, which requires a plaintiff to 
show that “(1) the defendant has engaged in predatory or anticompetitive conduct with (2) a specific 
intent to monopolize and (3) a dangerous probability of achieving monopoly power.” Spectrum Sports, 
Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 447 (1993). 
 146 See supra Section III.A. 
 147 See supra Section II.C.  
 148 See supra note 106 and accompanying text. 
 149 See supra note 106 (listing cases applying this framework). 
 150 For a critique of the test, see supra notes 109–112 and accompanying text. 
 151 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B) (2012). 
 152 FTC POLICY STATEMENT ON DECEPTION 2 (Oct. 14, 1983), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/410531/831014deceptionstmt.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7B99-NREQ]. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W  O N L I N E 
142 
for the misleading interpretation.”153 “[I]t can be deceptive,” the FTC 
explained, “to tell only half the truth, and to omit the rest.”154 Such a situation 
“may occur where a seller fails to disclose qualifying information” needed 
to prevent an “affirmative statement[] from creating a misleading 
impression.”155 
These types of omissions and half-truths have appeared in the biologic 
setting. Genentech, Amgen, and Janssen each have made assertions that 
implied differences between biologics and biosimilars, warning that the 
products were “not identical,” that “patients may react differently” to 
biosimilars, that biologics “cannot be copied exactly,” that switches “carr[y] 
risks, given that no two biologic medicines are identical,” that “[s]witching 
drugs is not a good idea if your medicine is working for you,” and that a 
failure to achieve interchangeability threatens safety.156 At a minimum (and 
applying a conservative analysis), these assertions result in at least one 
interpretation to a reasonable consumer that there are clinically meaningful 
differences between the biologic and the biosimilar. But this innuendo is 
false. And to the sophisticated actors at the biologic companies, this is not 
likely to be an oversight.157 
Turning to the second factor, the statements would be clearly material. 
The FTC has defined a “material” misrepresentation as “one which is likely 
to affect a consumer’s choice” of product.158 Such an assertion targets 
“information that is important to consumers.”159 The FTC presumes that even 
implied claims “are material if they pertain to the central characteristics of 
the product, such as its safety. . . .”160 Similarly, “omissions [are] material if 
they significantly involve health. . . .”161 To state the obvious, denigrating a 
biosimilar product is material. It is hard to imagine a statement more material 
than one warning of health concerns with a competitor’s product. 
Third, biologic manufacturers’ statements would clearly be likely to 
induce reasonable reliance. A representation about a biosimilar’s safety is 
exceedingly likely to discourage the patient from purchasing the product. At 
 
 153 Id. at 3. 
 154 In re Int’l Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. 949, 1057 (1984). 
 155 Id. 
 156 See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
 157 See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 52, Fed. Trade Comm’n v. AbbVie Inc., No. 14-
5151 (E.D. Pa. June 29, 2018) (“Since these experienced patent attorneys filed objectively baseless 
infringement lawsuits, it is reasonable to conclude that they intended the natural and probable 
consequences of acts they knowingly did.”). 
 158 FTC POLICY STATEMENT ON DECEPTION, supra note 152, at 5. 
 159 Id. 
 160 In re Int’l Harvester, 104 F.T.C. at  1057. 
 161 FTC POLICY STATEMENT ON DECEPTION, supra note 152, at 5. 
115:119 (2020) Don't Die! 
143 
the same time, doctors also would be less likely to prescribe the biosimilar 
and payors would be less likely to reimburse biosimilars. And not only would 
there be reliance, but it would also be reasonable given the unparalleled 
consequences of taking unsafe medications.162 
Fourth, the statements would be made to buyers without knowledge of 
the subject matter. Doctors rely on the pharmaceutical industry, “the most 
typical source of information about biosimilars,” with prescriptions based on 
information disseminated by the industry.163 In fact, doctors “report being 
unsure how to go about explaining biosimilars to patients, which further 
restricts their use.”164 This is unfortunate, as “positive framing can improve 
patients’ perceptions of biosimilars and increase their hypothetical 
willingness to switch to a biosimilar from a biologic treatment.”165 Perhaps it 
is not a surprise then that patients “hold concerns about biosimilars, 
particularly relating to safety, efficacy, manufacturing and clinical trials that 
need to be addressed to improve acceptability.”166 
The Lenox case discussed above167 supports a finding that the fourth 
factor is satisfied. That court found that “even sophisticated consumers [like 
hospitals and group purchasing organizations] would rely on false 
statements.”168 Here, it does not take a lot in the way of innuendo to dissuade 
patients from taking, and doctors from prescribing, biosimilars. Again, 
doctors rely on the pharmaceutical industry as “the most typical source of 
information about biosimilars.”169 Given doctors’ obligations to keep abreast 
of industry standards and avoid prescribing products with safety concerns, it 
is concerning that “the information disseminated by the pharmaceutical 
industry affects [doctors’] prescription decisions.”170 
 
 162 Such anticipated reliance further demonstrates the shortcomings of the Fifth Circuit analysis 
described above, see supra Section III.A, that “it will often be difficult to determine whether . . . false 
statements induced reliance by consumers and produced anticompetitive effects, or whether the buyer 
attached little weight to the statements and instead regarded them as biased and self-serving.” Retractable 
Techs., Inc. v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 842 F.3d 883, 895 (5th Cir. 2016). 
 163 Physicians Hold a Largely Positive View of the Uptake of Biosimilars, FIMEA (May 15, 2019), 
https://www.fimea.fi/web/en/-/physicians-hold-a-largely-positive-view-of-the-uptake-of-biosimilars 
[https://perma.cc/LQX8-5HGN]. 
 164 Chiara Gasteiger, Nicola Dalbeth & Keith Petrie, The Effects of Message Framing on Patients’ 
Perceptions and Willingness to Change to a Biosimilar in a Hypothetical Drug Switch, ARTHRITIS CARE 
& RES. (2019) (manuscript at 4) (on file with author). 
 165 Id. at 16. 
 166 Id. at 3. 
 167 See supra notes 113–117 and accompanying text. 
 168 Lenox MacLaren Surgical Corp. v. Medtronic, Inc., 762 F.3d 1114, 1127 (10th Cir. 2014). 
 169 Physicians Hold a Largely Positive View of the Uptake of Biosimilars, supra note 163. 
 170 Id. 
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Fifth, the statements’ effect would likely last for prolonged periods. In 
the Lenox case, the court found that the continued listing of Lenox’s device 
on the FDA’s website as recalled was enough to show a prolonged period.171 
Biologic companies have control over the market, and this factor would seem 
to be easily satisfied as they would be likely to promulgate the assertions for 
lengthy periods of time to maintain their monopolies. 
Sixth, the plaintiff would not be able to readily neutralize the 
disparaging statements. Once a safety concern is raised, it is particularly 
difficult to rebut. Consumers taking, and doctors prescribing, follow-on 
products that are not exactly the same as the original would tend to shy away 
from products with safety concerns. Given the dire consequences of drugs 
operating differently, it is natural to err on the side of avoiding biosimilars. 
At its core, the Lenox court emphasized the effect of potential liability 
concerns in secondary markets. Similarly, the central issue confronting 
doctors in prescribing biosimilars would be whether they are convinced the 
product operates in a similar manner to the biologic, or instead threatens 
patients’ safety or diminishes efficacy of treatment. Lenox provides a useful 
guidepost to future courts in emphasizing liability fears as a factor that can 
overcome the presumption of a de minimis impact on competition. 
In short, a plaintiff challenging a biologic firm’s disparagement of a 
biosimilar would likely satisfy the second through sixth factors of the de 
minimis test. A court applying a high standard for the first factor might find 
that the conduct, although misleading, is not “clearly false.” In applying the 
factors, courts should consider false advertising law and the FTC’s 
consideration of the issue, which would recommend liability. And, at a 
minimum, for courts that do not require each of the factors to be satisfied,172 
liability would most likely be found based on the presence of at least five of 
the six factors. 
C. Case-by-Case 
The case-by-case approach would be even more likely to find liability. 
By analyzing conduct as a whole without requiring a showing exceeding de 
minimis harm, the case-by-case approach offers flexibility that increases the 
likelihood of successful disparagement claims. This flexible framework 
would allow courts to consider the regulatory setting and the FDA’s lack of 
success in fostering robust biosimilar competition. It would also recognize 
the irreversible and lasting effects of locking new patients into biologics 
because they do not trust biosimilars. And, finally, it would consider the 
 
 171 Lenox, 762 F.3d at 1127. 
 172 See supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
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effects of disparagement in cementing the multiple barriers to entry that 
entrench the biologic’s power. 
Cases that have applied this approach offer building blocks for liability. 
Like the Third Circuit case mentioned earlier involving false statements 
impacting a rival’s financing costs,173 disparagement could adversely affect 
a biosimilar company’s ability to finance already-high expenses. Moreover, 
like the D.C. Circuit case, which found that deceptive statements resulted in 
anticompetitive conduct,174 false statements could lock in physician decision-
making.175 
The case-by-case approach could also allow plaintiffs to demonstrate 
that parties with monopoly power have satisfied the elements of the false 
advertising offense.176 Given the “near certainty” of anticompetitive effects 
in this setting, Professor Rebecca Tushnet and I have suggested that courts 
should adopt a presumption of monopolization when the elements at the core 
of false advertising law are satisfied.177 
Through its less regimented analysis, the case-by-case approach 
increases the likelihood that biologic companies would be found liable for 
monopolistic conduct. The approach would more likely consider the factors 
highlighted in Part II above (such as significant barriers to entry and the 
FDA’s ineffectiveness in bringing about robust biosimilar competition), 
allowing plaintiffs to show how these factors exacerbate anticompetitive 
effects of increased price and reduced output, and it would enable plaintiffs 
to illustrate how disparagement offers no legitimate procompetitive 
justifications. 
CONCLUSION 
Biologics are the wave of the future, promising to unleash revolutionary 
health benefits. But their price tag is staggering. And if biologic 
manufacturers can stifle more affordable biosimilars in their cradle by 
ominously implying false safety concerns, patients will suffer. Recognizing 
an antitrust cause of action for disparagement promises to enhance 
competition and help U.S. consumers afford life-saving medicines. 
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